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A few weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Pakistani Muslim hacking group 
GForce Pakistan announced the formation of the “Al-Qaeda Alliance Online” on a U.S. 
government website it had just defaced.  Declaring that “Osama bin Laden is a holy 
fighter, and whatever he says makes sense,” the group posted a list of demands and 
warned that it planned to hit major U.S. military and British websites.1  Another GForce 
defacement contained similar messages along with heart-wrenching images of badly 
mutilated children said to have been killed by Israeli soldiers.  A subsequent message 
from the group announced that two other Pakistani hacking groups had joined the 
alliance: the Pakistan Hackerz Club and Anti India Crew.  Collectively, the groups had 
defaced hundreds of websites, often with political messages. 
 
Was this a sign that al-Qa’ida had acquired a hacking unit bent on causing cyberterror – 
or just another group of hackers expressing themselves on public websites while trying to 
impress their peers?  In this case, it looked more like the latter.  On October 27, GForce 
wrote on a defaced U.S. military website that it was “not a group of cyber terrorists.” 
Condemning the attacks of September 11 and calling themselves “cyber crusaders,” they 
wrote, “ALL we ask for is PEACE for everyone.” This was among their last recorded 
defacements.  GForce Pakistan and all mention of the Al-Qaeda Alliance Online 
disappeared. 
 
The possibility of cyberterrorism, however, remains a concern, as Al-Qa’ida and other 
terrorist groups have become increasingly aware of the value of cyberspace to their 
objectives. They have become adept at using the Internet to distribute propaganda and 
other information, collect data about potential targets and weapons, communicate with 
cohorts and supporters, recruit, raise money, and generally facilitate their operations.  
They have advocated conducting cyber attacks and engaged in some hacking.  New 
hacking groups have emerged with apparent ties to terrorists.  Even if the Al-Qaeda 
Alliance Online does not pose a threat of cyberterror, others might. 
 
The purpose of this article is to assess the cyberterror threat, particularly from al-Qa’ida 
and the global jihadists who are part of the broader social movement associated with al-
Qa’ida.  As such, the view offered here supercedes that which I presented about five 
years ago, first to the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism of the Committee on Armed 
Services in the U.S. House of Representatives in May 20002 and then in an article written 
shortly after the September 11 attacks in 2001.3  This assessment was based primary on 
speculation of what terrorists would likely be interested and capable of achieving.  My 
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overall conclusion was that at least for the time being, bombs posed a much greater threat 
than bytes, but we should not shrug off the threat. 
 
The assessment offered in this paper is based less on speculation and more on indicators 
of cyberterror.  These are pieces of evidence that demonstrate a capability or intent to 
conduct cyberterror.  The ones I have found so far range from the actual conduct of cyber 
attacks to other types of activities that show at least some capability or intent.  The 
indicators are grouped into five categories, and each category examined in terms of the 
evidence found so far. 
 
While this paper evaluates the threat of cyberterror, it does not attempt to evaluate its 
risk.  To assess the cyberterror risk, one must consider not only the capabilities and 
motives of terrorists (the threat), but also the vulnerability of critical information systems 
to attack.  Without such vulnerabilities, there is no risk.  This paper does not address the 
vulnerability side of risk, and hence does not evaluate the likelihood of cyberterror 
operations succeeding.  Hence, it only addresses half of the risk equation. 
 
Before offering my current assessment, I will discuss what cyberterror is and is not.  I 
will also review two studies of cyberterror conducted by the Center on Terrorism and 
Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1999 and 2000, before my arrival 
in late 2002.  Although the studies are now over five years old and summarized in my 
earlier writings, my goal for the current paper is to provide a fairly complete assessment 
of the threat side of cyberterror. 
 
What is Cyberterrorism? 
 
Cyberterrorism is generally understood to refer to highly damaging computer-based 
attacks or threats of attack by non-state actors against information systems when 
conducted to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are 
political or social.  It is the convergence of terrorism with cyberspace, where cyberspace 
becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act.  Rather than committing acts of 
violence against persons or physical property, the cyberterrorist commits acts of 
destruction and disruption against digital property.   
 
Cyberterrorism is distinguished from cyberwar in that the former comprises acts 
performed by non-state actors, whereas the latter consists of government activity.  With 
cyberwar, a state’s military engages in cyber attacks against an adversary within the 
context of a declared war. 
 
Although cyberspace is constantly under assault by non-state actors, the attacks so far are 
generally not considered to be acts of cyberterrorism.  They fall short for two reasons.  
First, the attacks that are the most destructive and generate the most fear are conducted 
for goals that are neither political nor social.  For example, the worst denial-of-service 
attacks have generally been conducted to extort money from victims, put competitors out 
of business, and satisfy the egos and curiosity of young hackers.  Second, the attacks that 
have been linked to political and social goals have generally not been intimidating.  Most 
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have been simple web defacements that, while annoying and disruptive, do not have 
much impact.  They correspond more to the activity one might expect to see from 
protestors, not terrorists.  For this reason, such cyber attacks are often referred to as 
“hacktivism,” reflecting the convergence of hacking with activism rather than terrorism. 
 
To fall in the domain of cyberterror, a cyber attack should be sufficiently destructive or 
disruptive to generate fear comparable to that from physical acts of terrorism, and it must 
be conducted for political and social reasons.  Critical infrastructures, which include 
telecommunications, electrical power, oil and gas, water supply, transportation, banking 
and finance, emergency services, and essential government services, are likely targets.  
Attacks against these infrastructures that lead to death or bodily injury, extended power 
outages, plane crashes, water contamination, or billion dollar banking losses would be 
examples.   
 
To date, the most serious reported attack against a critical infrastructure took place in 
Australia in early 2000.  A 49-year-old Brisbane man penetrated the Maroochy Shire 
Council’s waste management system and used radio transmissions to alter pump station 
operations.  A million litres of raw sewage spilled into public parks and creeks on 
Queensland’s Sunshine Coast, killing marine life, turning the water black, and creating an 
unbearable stench.  However, the man’s goals were neither political nor social.  He was a 
former employee of the company that had installed the system, and was angry about 
being rejected for a council job.4  
 
Several computer viruses and worms have affected critical infrastructures.  For example, 
the Slammer worm shut down emergency 911 systems, ATM machines, and at least one 
airline booking system.  It disabled the safety monitoring system at a nuclear power plant 
for nearly 5 hours and affected several electrical and water utilities.  Although the source 
of the worm was not confirmed, it did not appear to be tied to any terrorists or terrorist 
motives.  The worm’s code contained a reference to the Honkers Union of China, a major 
Chinese hacking group. 
 
There have been numerous attacks against financial systems, including bank fraud and 
credit card fraud.  However, such attacks have been conducted for money, not to coerce 
governments and societies.  A terrorist group could attempt to steal billions through a 
cyber attack, with the dual goals of getting money to fund their organization and of 
coercing a target government.  So far, however, this has not happened. 
 
Because there have been no incidents that are generally regarded as cyberterrorism, the 
term itself has come to raise eyebrows.  Skeptics wonder if it is all hype, used mainly to 
justify spending on new programs and increased government surveillance of the Internet. 
 
Besides bearing little relation to any actual cyber incidents, the term also fails to capture 
the bulk of what terrorists are doing in cyberspace.  Terrorists are making extensive use 
of cyberspace to facilitate their objectives, and it is important to understand, exploit, and 
counter this use.  Too much emphasis on cyberterror, especially if it is not a serious 





The first comprehensive treatment of the cyberterrorism threat was performed by the 
Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CTIW) at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) in Monterey, California.  In August 1999, they issued a report on the prospects of 
terrorist organizations pursuing cyberterrorism.5  They concluded that the barrier to entry 
for anything beyond annoying hacks is quite high, and that terrorists generally lack the 
wherewithal and human capital needed to mount a meaningful operation.  
Cyberterrorism, they argued, was a thing of the future, although it might be pursued as an 
ancillary tool.  
 
The NPS study defined three levels of cyberterror capability:  
 
• Simple-Unstructured: The capability to conduct basic hacks against individual 
systems using tools created by someone else.  The organization possesses little 
target analysis, command and control, or learning capability. 
 
• Advanced-Structured: The capability to conduct more sophisticated attacks 
against multiple systems or networks and possibly, to modify or create basic 
hacking tools.  The organization possesses an elementary target analysis, 
command and control, and learning capability. 
 
• Complex-Coordinated: The capability for a coordinated attacks capable of 
causing mass-disruption against integrated, heterogeneous defenses (including 
cryptography).  Ability to create sophisticated hacking tools.  Highly capable 
target analysis, command and control, and organization learning capability. 
 
They estimated that it would take a group starting from scratch 2-4 years to reach the 
advanced-structured level and 6-10 years to reach the complex-coordinated level, 
although some groups might get there in just a few years or turn to outsourcing or 
sponsorship to extend their capability. 
 
The study examined five terrorist group types: religious, New Age, ethno-nationalist 
separatist, revolutionary, and far-right extremists.  They determined that only the 
religious groups are likely to seek the most damaging capability level, as it is consistent 
with their indiscriminate application of violence.  New Age or single issue terrorists, such 
as the Animal Liberation Front, pose the most immediate threat, however, such groups 
are likely to accept disruption as a substitute for destruction.  Both the revolutionary and 
ethno-nationalist separatists are likely to seek an advanced-structured capability.  The far-
right extremists are likely to settle for a simple-unstructured capability, as cyberterror 
offers neither the intimacy nor cathartic effects that are central to the psychology of far-
right terror.  The study also determined that hacker groups are psychologically and 
organizationally ill-suited to cyberterrorism, and that it would be against their interests to 
cause mass disruption of the information infrastructure. 
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In October 2000, the CTIW at NPS issued a second report following a conference aimed 
at examining the decision making process that leads sub-state groups engaged in armed 
resistance to develop new operational methods.6  They were particularly interested in 
learning whether such groups would engage in cyber terrorism.  In addition to academics 
and a member of the United Nations, the participants included a hacker and five 
practitioners with experience in violent sub-state groups.  The latter included the PLO, 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE), the Basque Fatherland and Liberty-
Political/Military (ETA-PM), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  
The participants engaged in a simulation exercise based on the situation in Chechnya. 
 
The “terrorist” team authorized only one cyber attack during the game, and that was 
against the Russian Stock Exchange.  The attack was justified on the grounds that the 
exchange was an elite activity and thus disrupting it would not affect most Russians.  
Indeed, it might appeal to the average Russian.  The group ruled out mass disruptions 
impacting e-commerce as being too indiscriminate and risking a backlash. 
 
The findings from the meeting were generally consistent with the earlier study.  
Recognizing that their conclusions were based on a small sample, they concluded that 
terrorists have not yet integrated information technology into their strategy and tactics; 
that sub-state groups may find cyber terror attractive as a non-lethal weapon; that 
significant barriers between hackers and terrorists may prevent their integration into one 
group; and that politically motivated terrorists had reasons to target selectively and limit 
the effects of their operations, although they might find themselves in a situation where a 




The NPS researchers applied their general knowledge of terrorists and cyber weapons to 
evaluate the threat of cyberterrorism.  By contrast, my recent work is based on identifying 
indicators of cyberterrorism.  These are pieces of evidence that demonstrate a capability 
or intent to conduct acts of cyberterror.  The ones I have identified so far fall into five 
categories: 
 
• Execution of cyber attacks.  This covers all types of computer network attack, not 
just acts of cyberterror. 
 
• Cyber weapons acquisition, development, and training.  This includes acquisition 
and distribution of cyber weapons, research and development in cyberweapons, 
and training in the use of cyberweapons.  Activities can take place on-line or in 
special facilities. 
 
• Statements about cyber attacks.  This covers all types of statements relating to 
cyber attacks, including discussions, declarations of intent, and calls for 
performing cyber attacks. 
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• Formal education in information technology.  This includes all areas of IT 
education, but especially studies in network and information security. 
 
• General experience with cyberspace.   This covers cyber activities that do not fall 
within the first four categories, including general use of the Internet for 
communications and distribution of news and propaganda. 
 
The categories are listed in order of generally decreasing significance; that is, the actual 
execution of cyber attacks carries more weight than acquisition and development of cyber 
attack tools, which in turn carries more weight than simply making statements about 
cyber attacks, and so on.  However, the ordering is not strict, as the nature of the evidence 
also matters.  Evidence of a cyber training camp that has been instructing scores of cyber 
jihadists in attacks against the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
would be a stronger indicator of cyberterrorism than evidence of a successful web 
defacement.  SCADA and other types of digital control systems are used to monitor and 
control critical infrastructures such as for electricity, oil and gas, water, dams, and 
sewage, and are considered likely candidates for cyberterrorist attacks. 
 
The last two categories, formal education in information technology (IT) and general 
experience in cyberspace are not indicators of cyberterrorism so much as enablers.  A 
terrorist could study computer science, for example, in order to manage information 
resources such as websites for the organization. Even a focus on network security could 
be for the purpose of defending terrorist systems and information rather than launching 
cyber attacks.  Still, terrorists with formal education in IT and experience using the 
technology are in a better position to develop a cyberterror capability than those without 
this background, so evidence in these categories is relevant to assessing the cyberterror 
threat.   
 
In seeking evidence relating to these indicators, I considered activities attributable not 
only to terrorist groups, but also to hackers expressing an alliance or sympathies with 
such groups.  Although the latter may not be willing to engage in physical acts of 
violence, they may be amenable to causing extensive damage to information resources.  
Also, it can be difficult to know the exact relationship between a terrorist group and 
hackers claiming some sort of affiliation.  The Al-Qaeda Alliance Online, for example, 
appeared to have no formal ties to the terrorist organization, but it might be considered 
part of the broader jihadi movement associated with it. 
 
The following subsections discuss each of the five indicator categories and the evidence I 
have found so far. 
 
Execution of Cyber Attacks 
 
Evidence of successful or even attempted computer network attacks is generally the 
strongest indicator of a cyberterrorism threat.  However, as suggested above, the specifics 
involved in such attacks also matter, including the objectives, targets, results, methods, 
and overall prevalence.  Attacks that seek to cause harm and generate fear are a stronger 
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indicator of cyberterrorism than ones that seek only other types of objectives such as 
money.  Even if terrorists fund their operations by hacking web servers and stealing 
credit card numbers, for example, such attacks would fall more in the domain of terrorist 
support operations than acts of terrorism. 
 
In addition, attacks against critical infrastructures are a stronger indicator than those 
against websites and non-essential services.  Whether an attack is successful and the level 
of damage it causes also matters.  Even so, a failed attack against the power grid would 
be more indicative of a cyberterror threat than a successful web defacement.  The level of 
skill involved in an attack, as displayed through the methods used, is another important 
factor in judging an attack’s significance.  Finally, a single, isolated attack bears less 
significance than a demonstrated capability manifest in multiple attacks.   
 
Over the years, numerous cyber attacks have been attributed to hackers affiliated with 
terrorist organizations or sympathetic to terrorist causes.  Although none of these attacks 
has caused sufficient damage to be labeled an act of cyberterror, they have demonstrated 
a capability to disrupt e-mail and web services, and to use cyber attacks to raise money. 
 
The first reported incident of this nature took place in 1997 when an offshoot of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claimed responsibility for “suicide email 
bombings” against Sri Lankan embassies over a two-week period.  Calling themselves 
the Internet Black Tigers, the group swamped Sri Lankan embassies with about 800 
emails a day.  The messages read, “We are the Internet Black Tigers and we’re doing this 
to disrupt your communications.”7  The Tamil Tigers are also credited with using a cyber 
attack to raise money.  After compromising a computer system at Sheffield University in 
England in 1997 and capturing the user IDs and passwords of respected faculty, they used 
the email accounts to send out messages asking donors to send money to a charity in Sri 
Lanka.8
 
The Kosovo conflict in 1999 inspired numerous hackers to join the conflict on one side or 
the other, or to protest the whole thing.  Most of their cyber attacks took the form of web 
defacements, but there were also a few denial of service attacks.  Of particular interest 
here are the activities of the Serb Black Hand (Crna Ruka) group, because of the radical 
nature of Crna Ruka.  According to reports, they crashed a Kosovo Albanian web site, 
justifying their actions with the statement “We shall continue to remove ethnic Albanian 
lies from the Internet.”  They also planned daily actions against NATO computers and 
deleted data on a Navy computer.9
 
Several years ago, the Animal Liberation Front took responsibility for a few cyber 
attacks.  These included web defacements and virtual sit-ins (modest denial of service 
attacks against websites).  They threatened additional cyber attacks, but I have not seen 
evidence of such. 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has provoked numerous cyber attacks from hackers on 
both sides of the conflict.  This was especially intense during the Second Intifada, which 
erupted in late September 2000.  According to the security firm iDefense, at least two of 
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the pro-Palestinian groups involved in the parallel cyber intifada had terrorist 
connections.10  One of these was UNITY, a Muslim extremist group with ties to 
Hizballah.  After pro-Israeli hackers attacked Hizballah’s website, the hackers launched a 
coordinated, multi-phased denial of service attack, first against official Israeli 
government sites, second against Israeli financial sites, third against Israeli ISPs, and 
fourth, against “Zionist E-Commerce” sites.  The other group, al-Muhajiroun, has ties to 
a number of Muslim terrorist organizations as well as bin Laden.  The London-based 
group directed their members to a Web page, where at the click of a mouse members 
could join an automated flooding attack against Israeli sites that were attacking 
Moqawama (Islamic Resistance) sites.  iDefense also noted that UNITY recruited and 
organized a third group, Iron Guard, which conducted more technically sophisticated 
attacks.  According to a Canadian government report, the group’s call for cyber jihad was 
supported and promoted by al-Muhajiroun.11
 
The opening paragraph of this paper mentions the cyber attacks by GForce Pakistan and 
the formation of the Al-Qaeda Alliance Online in the wake of the September 11 attacks.  
Muslim hackers associated with one of the other Alliance members, the Pakistan Hackerz 
Club (PHC), had already defaced numerous websites with messages supporting Kashmir 
independence and the Palestinians.  During the cyber intifada in November 2000, Doctor 
Nuker, a founder of PHC, posted 700 credit card numbers and 3,500 e-mail addresses on 
the website of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.  He had acquired the data 
from the web server when he broke into it.  
 
In 2003, a call for cyber attacks against Israeli computers appeared on a website affiliated 
with Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas.  Under the heading “the 
electronic jihad,” someone opened a discussion about using computer viruses to inflict 
harm on Israel.  The idea was to load a virus-infected page onto a website and then take 
steps to attract as many Israeli visitors as possible to the site.12   
 
In early 2004, Internet Haganah, a website devoted to confronting Islamic terrorists on 
the Internet and stopping their use of the net as a communications and propagation tool, 
reported that the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was planning a cyber attack against the El Al 
website.13  Internet Haganah also reported that its own website, which is part of the 
Israeli domain “.il,” was the target of jihadists.  A message posted to a Yahoo! group 
attempted to recruit 600 Muslims for jihad cyber attacks against Internet Haganah.  The 
motive was retaliation against Internet Haganah’s efforts to close down terrorist-related 
websites.  Muslim hackers were asked to register to a Yahoo! group called Jehad-Op.14   
 
According to the Anti-Terrorism Coalition (ATC), the jihad was organized by a group 
named Osama Bin Laden (OBL) Crew, which also threatened attacks against the ATC 
website.15  Founded in 2000 by an al-Qa’ida member living in Holland, since 2002 OBL 
Crew has been under the leadership of a San Diego man calling himself Ibn Shahbaz.  
Although the promised attacks against ATC either failed or never materialized, OBL 




As I complete this article in February 2006, Zone-h has recorded over two thousand web 
defacements, many in Denmark, protesting the twelve cartoons satirizing the Prophet 
Mohammad that were first published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.  While 
many of the attacks were conducted “just for fun,” “as a challenge,” and “to be the best 
defacer,” the substantial number performed for “political reasons,” “patriotism,” and 
“revenge” might be indicative of a growing cadre of cyber jihadists.  According to Zone-
h, one of the defacers, the Internet Islamic Brigades (IIB), had also posted warnings of 
suicide bombings on a Danish forum, suggesting the group was interested in more than 
just relatively minor cyber attacks.16   
 
According to the Jamestown  Foundation, the radical jihadist al-Ghorabaa website 
coordinated a 24-hour cyber attack against Jyllands-Posten and other newspapers sites.  
Participants in the al-Ghorabaa forum also discussed broadening their campaign. 
Following the burning of the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus and Beirut, 
they purportedly called for a global “embassy-burning day” against Danish embassies all 
over the world.17  Internet Haganah also reported that a group (perhaps the same?) 
claiming credit for attacking Jyllands-Posten’s website had released a video purporting to 
document the attack.  The video was in the style of jihadi videos coming out of Iraq, 
showing that the hackers were emulating the tactics of violent jihadists.18  These activities 
show an association between hacking and more violent forms of jihad, which could be 
precursors to cyberterrorism.   
 
Cyber jihadists have also conducted cyber attacks in support of other objectives, 
including intelligence collection and information sharing.  In an article on the challenges 
of terrorism in the information age, Magnus Ranstorp reports that al-Qa’ida had broken 
into the e-mail account of a U.S. diplomat in the Arab world.  The terrorists had used 
simple password cracking tools, freely available on the Internet, to gain access to the 
account.  They had retrieved his bank statements, which revealed information about his 
location and movement.19
 
Terrorists or their sympathizers have reportedly hijacked Internet servers in order to share 
documents.  While this might not be considered an “attack,” it nonetheless represents 
unauthorized use of computers.  In one such case, 70 files were uploaded to an 
unprotected File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site run by the Arkansas government for its 
contractors.  A person calling himself Irhabi 007, or Terrorist 007, put links to the files on 
a message board belonging to al Ansar.20  The motivations for using hijacked sites could 
include access to free storage and avoidance of detection by authorities. 
 
 
Cyber Weapons Acquisition, Development, and Training 
 
Terrorist groups typically supply their members with weapons, acquired on black markets 
or developed in-house.  They also provide training in the use of these weapons.  Al-
Qa’ida, for example, operated training camps in Afghanistan and Sudan for thousands of 
jihadists.  Some of these facilities are also used for weapons research and development.  
In addition, terrorists provide training materials in the form of written documents and 
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videos, which are distributed to members.  One video even shows how to build a suicide 
belt. 
 
If terrorists are to conduct highly damaging cyber attacks, I would expect to see similar 
activities in the cyber domain, including acquisition, research, development, distribution, 
and training in cyber weapons.  So far, there have been a few such indicators.  According 
to Magnus Ranstorp, an al-Qa’ida safe house in Pakistan was used to train operational 
members in computer hacking and to conduct cyber reconnaissance against infrastructure 
and SCADA systems, probing the control mechanisms of electrical power grids and dam 
structures.21  While this could be a strong indicator of an attempt to develop a cyberterror 
capability, I could not find any other information about it or information suggesting that 
al-Qa’ida had developed or acquired cyber tools for attacking these systems. 
 
In January 2002, the National Infrastructure Protection System (NIPC) also reported that 
al-Qa’ida members had “sought information on Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA-related websites.  They 
specifically sought information on water supply and wastewater management practices in 
the U.S. and abroad.”  The NIPC bulletin also noted that the FBI had found structural 
architecture software (CATIGE, BEAM, AUTOCAD 2000, and MICROSTRAN) on the 
computer of a person with indirect ties to bin Laden.  The software suggested the 
individual was interested in structural engineering as it relates to dams and other water-
retaining structures.22  However, the software could be useful in planning either physical 
or cyber attacks against these structures, so the research is not necessarily related to 
cyberterror. 
 
Other indicators point to on-line training in cyber attacks.  In late 2003, an affiliate of al-
Qa’ida announced the opening of Al-Qa’ida University for Jihad Sciences on the Internet, 
with a college on electronic jihad.  The announcement was circulated by the Islamic 
Information Center, which in the past had disseminated statements by bin Laden on the 
Internet.  The other colleges include the technology of explosive devices, booby-trapped 
cars and vehicles, and media jihad. The announcement noted that there were already 
specialists in electronic Jihad.23   
 
In August 2005, the Jamestown Foundation reported that the jihadist al-Farouq web 
forum contained postings calling for heightened electronic attacks against U.S. and allied 
government websites, and information for mujahid hackers.  The website included a 
hacker library with information for disrupting and destroying enemy electronic resources.  
The library held keylogging software for capturing keystrokes and acquiring passwords 
on compromised computers, software tools for hiding or misrepresenting the hacker’s 
Internet address, and disk and system utilities for erasing hard disks and incapacitating 
Windows-based systems.24
 
Two months later, Jamestown reported that a manual on hacking was posted on another 
Internet forum frequented by jihadists, Minbar ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a (The Pulpit of 
the People of the Sunna).  The document was said to be written in a pedagogical style and 
discuss motives and incentives for computer-based attacks, including political, strategic, 
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economic, and individual.  It was also said to discuss three types of attack: direct 
intrusions into corporate and government networks, infiltration of personal computers to 
steal personal information, and interception of sensitive information such as credit card 
numbers in transit.25
 
In February 2006, Jamestown noted that “Most radical jihadi forums devote an entire 
section to [hacker warfare].”  They said that the al-Ghorabaa site, which had coordinated 
an attack against Jyllands-Posten, contained information on penetrating computer devices 
and intranet servers, stealing passwords, and security.  It also contained an encyclopedia 
on hacking sites and a 344-page book on hacking techniques, including a step-by-step 
guide for “terminating pornographic sites and those intended for the Jews and their 
supporters.”26
 
Imam Samudra, one of the terrorists convicted in the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings, 
offers rudimentary information on hacking, particularly as it applies to credit card fraud 
(“carding”) in a chapter titled “Hacking: why not?” of his autobiography Me Against the 
Terrorist!  Sumadra advocates the use of computer attacks to raise funds for terrorist 
activities.  Evidence found on his seized computer showed he at least had made an 
attempt at carding.27   
 
Hacking groups provide a forum for exchanging cyber attack tools and methods, and 
learning how to use them.  Although much of the activity takes place online, in some 
cases, members meet in person and learn from each other.   In 1998, for example, the 
Muslim Hackers Club (MHC) sent an e-mail announcing that their president, brother 
Ibrahim, would be visiting Pakistan and offering local MHC chapters classes in hacking 
Internet Service Providers and network protocols.  The classes would also teach how to 
set up Windows-NT-based servers.  The message went on to say that “MHC’s main 
orientation will be to setup a nonstate capability in information warfare, err, research, if 
that makes you feel better.”  The MHC also operated a website with hacking information, 
tutorials, and software tools.28
 
There are thousands of hacking groups worldwide.  A group could align itself with 
terrorists at any time, adding to the skill base that can be applied to cyberterrorism.  Even 
though the overwhelming majority would never support terrorism, evidence has shown 
that at least some have hacked in support of the same objectives. 
 
Statements About Cyber Attacks 
 
Statements by terrorists pertaining to the use cyber attacks can indicate an interest or 
intent to carry out cyberterrorism.  Such statements can take the form of exploratory 
discussions, forecasts, threats, advocacy, calls to action, and claims relating to capability 
or responsibility for attacks.   
 
In some cases, statements about cyberterrorism have been issued in conjunction with 
lesser attacks.  For example, not long after September 11, an anti-US defacement carried 
the message: “IN NEXT DAYS YOU’LL LOOK THE GREATEST 
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CYBERTERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
COMPUTERS.”  The threatened cyberterrorism, however, never materialized. 
 
Various statements from al-Qa’ida and its supporters have shown that the possibilities of 
cyberterrorism are at least on the terrorist network’s radar screen.  For example, 
following the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden allegedly told Hadmid Mir, editor 
of the Ausaf newspaper, that “hundreds of Muslim scientists were with him and who 
would use their knowledge in chemistry, biology and (sic) ranging from computers to 
electronics against the infidels.”29   
 
In December 2001, Newsbytes reported that a suspected member of al-Qa’ida said that 
members of the terrorist network had infiltrated Microsoft and attempted to plant Trojan 
horses and bugs in the Windows XP operating system.30 According to the report, 
Mohammad Afroze Abdul Razzak told Indian police that the terrorists had gained 
employment at Microsoft by posing as computer programmers.  Microsoft responded by 
saying the claims were “bizarre and unsubstantiated and should be treated skeptically.”   
Although the claims are almost certainly false, the story is troubling for the simple reason 
that it shows that at least some terrorists are fully cognizant of the potential of cyber 
attacks and how such attacks can be launched with the aid of Trojan horses and insider 
access into the world’s dominant software producer.  
 
National Review reported that a Syrian cyberterrorist whose day job was running a car 
dealership invited potential Islamic hackers to join the Arab Electronic Jihad Team 
(AEJT).  Announced in 2002, the goals of AEJT were to bring down all websites in the 
United States and Israel.  The group sought members who were “advanced in the art of 
hacking.”31 As 2002 drew to a close, U.S. and Israeli websites remained standing. 
 
Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, the London-based Islamic cleric who heads al-
Muhajiroun and has ties to bin Laden, told Computer World in November 2002 that al-
Qa’ida and other radical Muslim groups were actively planning to use the Internet as a 
weapon in their holy war against the West.  He noted that the military wings of al-Qa’ida 
and other radical Islamic groups were using and studying the Internet for their own 
operations.  He said that “in a matter of time, you will see attacks on the stock market,” 
and that he “would not be surprised if tomorrow I hear of a big economic collapse 
because of somebody attacking the main technical systems in big companies.”32
 
As noted earlier, postings on the al-Farouq website in 2005 called for cyber attacks 
against the U.S. and allied governments.  One participant, who identified himself as 
“archrafe,” proposed forming an operations unit within the Islamic Hacker Army (Jaish 
al-Hacker al-Islami). He offered advantages to organizing the electronic jihad 
community, including the ability to launch simultaneous denial of service attacks.33
 
Two years earlier, a book advocating cyber attacks against infidel websites was posted on 
al-Farouq’s website.  Titled The 39 Principles of Jihad, the book calls upon every 
Muslim to “obey the Jihad against the infidels.”  The principles suggest different ways of 
doing so, including participating in martyrdom and other operations, supplying money 
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and equipment to fighters, and so forth.  Principle 34 specifically directs computer 
experts to “use their skills and experience in destroying American, Jewish and secular 
websites as well as morally corrupt web sites.”34
 
According to Fouad Husseing, cyberterrorism is part of al-Qa’ida’s long-term war against 
the U.S.  In his book, al-Zarqawi-al-Qaeda’s Second Generation, Husseing describes al-
Qa’ida’s seven-phase war as revealed through interviews of the organization’s top 
lieutenants.  Phase 4, which is scheduled for the period 2010-2013, includes conducting 
cyberterrorism against the U.S. economy.35  Given other evidence, this is conceivable. 
 
Formal Education in Information Technology 
 
Although it is not hard to carry out relatively simple cyber attacks using readily available 
hacking tools, considerably greater skill would be required to develop software to 
perform original and highly damaging attacks against critical infrastructures.  For such 
attacks, formal education in a field such as computer science or computer engineering 
would be helpful, especially if the program of study included digital controls sytems and 
network security.  Although courses in information and network security emphasize how 
to defend against cyber attacks, they inevitably teach something about attacks, as it is not 
possible to build adequate defenses without a solid understanding of the threat. 
 
A few people with formal education in these areas have been associated with terrorist 
groups.  Sami Al-Arian, the professor at the University of South Florida charged with 
raising money for Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was in the department of Computer Science 
and Engineering.  Although Al-Arian’s area of specialty did not appear to be network 
security, Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, the Saudi graduate student at the University of Idaho 
charged with operating websites used to recruit terrorists, raise money to support 
terrorism, and disseminate inflammatory rhetoric, was studying computer security in the 
Computer Science Department.  However, neither Al-Arian or Al-Hussayen were 
convicted of any crimes. 
 
In Black Ice, Dan Verton describes how a computer science major at Columbia College 
in Missouri became al-Qa’ida’s procurement officer in the U.S. for computers, satellite 
telephones, and sophisticated surveillance technologies.  Along the way, Ziyad Khalil, 
using the pseudoname Ziyad Sadaqa, registered as the operator of Hamas’s website, 
www.palestine-info.net.  From there, he eventually came to the attention of al-Qa’ida.36
 
In perhaps the most significant case of all, a computer science graduate student at 
Bradley University was allegedly assigned by al-Qa’ida to explore ways of hacking into 
the computer systems of U.S. banks and to help settle al-Qa’ida members entering the 
United States for attacks.  According to reports, Ali S. Marri had been trained in 
computer hacking and the use of poisons, and had met Osama bin Laden at the al Farooq 
camp in Afghanistan.  Marri was designated an enemy combatant by President Bush in 
2003.37  This is the only case where the subject’s activities and educational program were 
tied to an objective of conducting cyber attacks.  Those of Al-Arian, Al-Hussayen, and 
Khalil did not appear to involve cyber attacks. 
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General Experience With Cyberspace 
 
Although most people who use computers and the Internet never conduct any cyber 
attack, it is also true that experience with the technology is a prerequisite for conducting 
destructive cyber attacks.  Terrorist groups that make extensive use of cyberspace are 
better equipped to move in the direction of employing cyberterrorism than those that do 
not. 
 
In this regard, numerous terrorist groups, and especially those affiliated with al-Qa’ida 
and the global jihad, have made extensive use of cyberspace to distribute documents, 
videos, audio recordings, and other materials; and to communicate with cohorts, recruit, 
raise money, gather intelligence about targets and weapons, discuss options, and 
generally facilitate their organizations and operations.  They have operated websites with 
password-protected areas and used e-mail, web forums and discussion groups, instant 
messaging and chat, and encryption.38, ,39 40  Jihadists are even said to have developed a 
web browser that filters out all websites except for that of the pre-eminent Salafist 
ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.41  However, none of these activities require the 




The foregoing evidence shows that terrorist groups and jihadists have an interest in 
conducting cyber attacks and at least some capability to do so.  Further, they are 
attempting to develop and deploy this capability through online training and calls for 
action.  The evidence does not, however, support an imminent threat of cyberterrorism.  
Any cyber attacks originating with terrorists or cyber jihadists in the near future are likely 
to be conducted either to raise money (e.g., via credit card theft) or to cause damage 
comparable to that which takes place daily from web defacements, viruses and worms, 
and denial-of-service attacks.  While the impact of those attacks can be serious, they are 
generally not regarded as acts of terrorism.  Terrorists have not yet demonstrated that 
they have the knowledge and skills to conduct highly damaging attacks against critical 
infrastructures (e.g., causing power outages), although there are a few indicators showing 
at least some interest.  Using the terminology from the 1999 NPS study, their capability is 
at the lowest level, namely that required to carry out simple-unstructured attacks.  
 
A disclaimer, however, is in order.  The assessment is based entirely on open sources.  
Intelligence agencies may have addition information that would suggest a higher level of 
threat.  Further, terrorists could be engaging in cyber activities that have not even made 
the radar screens of the intelligence agencies.  
 
Looking further into the future, it is difficult to know where terrorism might lead.  It is 
conceivable that cyber weapons will never draw the appeal of bombs and other physical 
weapons.  However, I can suggest a few indicators that would likely precede a successful 
incident of cyberterror: 
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• Failed cyber attacks against critical infrastructures, particularly the SCADA and 
other digital systems that are used to monitor and control these infrastructures.  It 
seems unlikely that a first attempt would succeed with the desired effect, given 
the novelty of such an attack and uncertainty about how it would play out. 
 
• Research and training labs, where terrorists simulate the effects of cyber attacks 
against critical infrastructures, develop methods and tools of attack against those 
infrastructures, and train people on how to conduct such attacks.  Although 
hackers use the Internet itself as their research and training lab, trying out various 
attacks on live systems, it is hard to perform controlled experiments and analyze 
the consequences without a lab.  Absent special facilities, I would expect to at 
least see training materials showing terrorists how to conduct damaging attacks 
against critical infrastructures and software tools designed to facilitate such 
attacks. 
 
• Extensive discussions and planning relating to acts of cyberterror against critical 
infrastructures, not just attacks against websites and attacks aimed at making 
money. 
 
Many authors have suggested that terrorists may be more inclined to use cyberterror as an 
ancillary tool to amplify the effects of a physical attack.  For example, they might launch 
a cyber attack against the emergency 911 system while blowing up a hotel, the goal being 
to impede response to the incident and increase fear.  However, terrorists do not normally 
integrate multiple modes of attack.  While there have been numerous incidents involving 
coordinated attacks – including the 9/11 hijackings, the London subway bombings, the 
Madrid train bombings, and the East African Embassy bombings – these have always 
involved multiple occurrences of pretty much the same thing (e.g., 4 hijacked planes 
turned into missiles in the 9/11 attacks).  It seems unlikely that terrorists would suddenly 
succeed with an attack requiring coordination across the cyber and physical domains.  
Even if this becomes their goal, I would expect to see evidence of failed attempts, cross-
domain training and simulation, and discussions and planning relating to such attacks 
before a successful incident.  Given terrorists’ capabilities today in the cyber domain, this 
seems no more imminent than other acts of cyberterror.   
 
In summary, my overall assessment of the cyberterror threat is much the same as five 
years ago.  At least in the near future, bombs remain a much larger threat than bytes.  
However, we cannot ignore the potential of cyberterror.  During the past five years, 
terrorists and jihadists have shown a stronger interest in and capability to conduct cyber 
attacks, and they have successfully conducted numerous attacks against websites. 
 
Moreover, even if our critical infrastructures are not under imminent threat by terrorists 
seeking political and social objectives, they must be protected from harmful attacks 
conducted for other reasons such as money, revenge, youthful curiosity, and war.  The 
owners of these infrastructures and their governments must defend against cyber attacks 
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